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Chapter 7 
State Hierarchy and Governance:  
Of Shadows or Equivalence in  
Regulating Global Crisis
Mark Findlay
Introduction
The nation-state has had its day. Not just as a governance context but as an 
analytical tool, the state has failed most those who are in desperate need of 
good governance. In the resource rich and regulatory poor world the state has 
collaborated in its own demise. Created as a shelter for the common good, the 
state is now a shell for sheltering self-interest. From this deontological demise 
grows crisis and in a globalized world such crisis is beyond the territoriality 
which states treasure.
Regulating global crisis sounds like a contradiction in terms. If ever there was 
an era of crisis worldwide, man-made and natural, it is now. At the same time as 
global warming, epidemic poverty and disease, international financial meltdown, 
and the erosion of self-determination and privacy reveal, regulatory strategies 
are failing the challenge. Then why attempt to address crisis with regulation at 
anything more than an aspirational level?
The reasons for regulation’s perceived and recurrent failure are both simple 
and profound. Over a decade ago I argued in The Globalisation of Crime1 that the 
myopic focus of the West on globalization as its problem and its unique opportunity 
to monopolize socioeconomic development denied the pressing significance of 
its impacts on cultures in transition. A driving motivation behind these critical 
reflections expands on a realization2 that:
consolidated statehood is the exception rather than the rule in the contemporary 
international system … outside the world of developed and highly industrialised 
democratic states most countries contain what we call “areas of limited statehood.” 
1 Findlay, M. 1999. The Globalisation of Crime: Understanding Transitional 
Relationships in Context. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2 As well summarized in Borzel, T. and Risse, T. 2010. Governance Without a State: 
Can it Work? Regulation and Governance, 4, 113–34.
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The Dual State154
While areas of limited statehood still belong to internationally recognised states 
… it is their domestic sovereignty which is severely circumscribed.3
The regulation literature (policy included) is vastly over-concerned with the 
Western, Westphalian socioeconomic contexts. For instance, the debate about non-
state centered regulation evolves from the assumption of a functioning, strong 
Weberian4 state framework. Most modes of governance, however, domestically 
and particularly internationally today do not exist in any such sophisticated 
counter-regulatory shadow.5 As such, the top-down or bottom-up hierarchies of 
regulation6 which rely on eventual state institutionalized enforcement capacity are 
relevant only to a select hegemony of states and economies:
The language of hierarchy, hegemony and empire has become the analytical 
prism through which scholars explain the emerging politics of globalization.7
This emphasis in the analytical literature may arise from the conviction that 
preferred governance modes (state, international organizations, NGOs, MNCs, 
public/private partnerships (PPPs)) reside in capitalist, neoliberal socio-politics. 
As such, contemporary considerations of international political economy “such 
as neo-liberalism or neo-realism are too state-centred in their assumptions to fully 
appreciate the growing importance of non-state actors and various transitional 
networks.”8 An argument to justify the disciplinary deficit when it comes to 
imagining non-Western, non-capitalist regulatory frameworks might consist of 
stating the obvious: these are the dominant political and economic models and 
as such should drive the global regulatory mission. This dogmatic differentiation 
might be a convincing argument were it not for the realization that:
• the conditions of global crisis are created by both the developed and the 
developing world;
• the negative consequences of global crisis are felt much more profoundly 
in the developing world;
• the failure of regulation is not limited to areas of weak or limited statehood;
3 Borzel, T. and Risse, T. 2010. 118.
4 Gerth, H. H. and Wright Mills, C. 1946. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press; Lassman, P. and Spiers, R. 1994. Weber: Political 
Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5 For a discussion of this in terms of global governance and new politics see, Teubner, G. 
1997. Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in World Society, in Global Law Without a State, 
edited by G. Teubner. Dartmouth: Brookfield. 3–28.
6 Braithwaite, J. 2008. Regulatory Capitalism. London: Edward Elgar.
7 Cooley, A. 2003. Thinking Rationally about Hierarchy and Global Governance. 
Review of International Political Economy, 10/4, 672–84 at 673.
8 Cooley, A. 2003. 673. Also see Strange, S. 1996. The Retreat from the State. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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State Hierarchy and Governance 155
• regulatory failure is not always corrected under the shadow or within the 
hierarchies of strong states; and
• the modes of social coordination and embedded social markets essential 
for good governance in non-consolidated state terrain are at the heart of 
regulating global crisis, whatever the context.
The task for a more inclusive analysis of incentives to confront global crisis is 
to disentangle and reveal the contextual relationships between these modes of 
social coordination in order that regulating global crisis can be given a flatter and 
wider sweep. This will take our thinking away from hierarchies and more toward 
relationships in which the incentives to minimize and avoid crisis are stimulated. 
In these relationships it is the role of “functional equivalents” for a state-based 
shadow of hierarchy that enable the “effective and sustainable non-hierarchical 
modes of governance involving non-state actors in areas of limited state-hood.”9
This perspective leads to a more organic and harmonious shift from crisis to 
ordering. Beyond the rehabilitation of configurations of limited statehood (and 
more broadly the place of transitional cultures in contemporary globalization) 
within current governance scholarship, is the purpose of understanding and 
maximizing incentives to cooperation in the prevention and management of global 
crisis. Like it or not, state-focused or otherwise, we are obliged to reflect on styles 
and situations of governance which are multi-layered beyond consolidated state 
hierarchies. Aligned with this is the inescapable need to reflect on the state beyond 
Western constellations or muffled by cosmopolitan dreaming.
Realistic Reflections on the Global State
For the purposes of the analysis to follow I am greatly assisted through 
conceptualizing the state (local and global) as a constellation of power and 
authority placed somewhere on a continuum between deep consolidation and 
weak fragmentation. Progressing along that continuum it is fair to assume that the 
influence of governance hierarchies diminishes and the enforcement shadow of the 
state fades. So too as we move from consolidation to fragmentation, governance 
relocates from within to beyond the state. This shift should not be confused as 
governance without government. Rather it means that the analyst needs to stop 
struggling to find the institutions of the strong state as evidence of good governance 
and governability, and delve more deeply into what Borzel and Risse (2010) refer 
to as “functional equivalents” of the state’s imminence.
While there are many configurations of limited statehood (not confined to 
failed states or to a failure to control territory), the modern liberal democratic 
notions of the state exhibit a consistent and almost universal emphasis on:
9 Borzel, T. and Risse, T. 2010. 120.
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The Dual State156
• the ability to enforce collectively binding decisions;
• ultimately through a monopoly over the means of legitimate violence;10
• operating through hierarchies of authority with sanctioning at the apex;
• demonstrating an institutionalized authority structure and a bureaucracy for 
its execution; and
• authoritatively making, implementing and enduring central decisions for a 
collectivity.
Universals characterizing limited statehood are more difficult to identify as even 
some consolidated states may contain areas of limited influence. Identifiers may 
include:
• weak domestic sovereignty;
• loss of monopoly over the use of force;
• partial enforcement powers;
• non-hierarchical authority structures;
• reduced administrative capacity;
• loss of control over territorial or functional space; and
• evidence of traditional or new non-hierarchical modes of governance.
A function of the consolidated state is law-making. Law diminishes in governance 
significance as it moves to the supranational11 or it fails to endorse private rights and 
public obligation when the enforcement shadow of the state is faint or fragmented.
Is Law Beyond, Not Without, the State?12
The role of law as a regulator in a world where the reach of domestic jurisdiction 
is becoming more and more constrained and where supranational law is not yet 
achieved is a reason for discussing law’s relevance in general. In systems theory 
terms autopoetic considerations of private law systems in particular offer a new 
vision of what some think of as being a false dichotomy between law within 
and beyond the state.13 The contract, for example, can create its own legal order 
10 This has been diminishing in recent times of global conflict in particular to where 
the state outsources the means and delivery of violence and as such can only claim to 
authorize this process of agency.
11 For a general discussion of this at both expressive and facilitative levels see 
Morgan, B. and Yeung, K. 2007. An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and 
Materials. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6.
12 This is a question asked by Michaels in his critique of considering Lex Mercatoria 
as law beyond the state. See Michaels, R. 2007. The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the 
State. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 14/2, 447–68.
13 For a richer discussion of this see Teubner, G. 1997.
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State Hierarchy and Governance 157
through its internal hierarchies of obligations and rights, combining primary 
norms (contractual rights and obligations) with secondary norms giving these 
primary norms their validity. In this way a legal system in microcosm, including 
objective law and possible adjudication, emerges out of, and applies to, the 
contract. Such a contract can well explain how commercial arrangements can 
be regulated through contracts prevailing even in limited or fragmented state 
settings where legal hierarchies are impotent and where political and economic 
enforcement administrations of the state cast little or no deterrent shadow over 
contracting parties.
Perez suggests14 that it is not simply inevitable but in fact to be preferred 
that public interests can be absorbed into the otherwise sacrosanct interests of 
contractual private parties; in particular, it is where communities are directly 
influenced by large-scale construction, the argument goes, that community 
interests have a place within private contractual negotiations, intersecting public 
and private goods. In similar fashion, Michaels argues against state parallels when 
trying to imagine the future of supranational legal regulation:
Authors endorsing the a-national or non national character of lex mercatoria, 
I argue, are barking up the wrong tree. In perpetuating the state/non state 
dichotomy, the lex mercatoria without state remains within a state focused legal 
paradigm.15
But for Michaels, as with Brandt, the state referent for supranational legal 
regulation is not inevitable or perpetual. In the sense that the legal system creates 
itself in separation (but not away from) the influences of the institutions of politics, 
law can be seen as without the state. At the global level however the internal 
differentiation of legal systems applying supranationally is not so easily or ideally 
divorced from politics or economy. At the global level law as regulation still 
represents a segmentary differentiation, linked hard or soft to the functioning of 
state interest. That is the immediate barrier to Brandt’s new politics or Teubner’s 
global law. In later writing on non-state governance16 Michaels provocatively 
suggests that for law and governance as state indicia, it is not about state/non-state 
divides, but that the analyst must “put the state in perspective in order to overcome 
it.”17 Here is where the challenge emerges for considerations of governance to 
detach from hierarchies with the state, characterized by its sanctioning capacity 
toward the apex.
14 Perez, O. 2002. Using Public-Private Linkages to Regulate Environmental 
Conflicts: The Case of International Construction Contracts. Journal of Law and Society, 
29/1, 77–110.
15 Michaels, R. 2007. 452.
16 Michaels, R. 2010. The Mirage of Non-State Governance. Utah Law Review, 1, 
31–45.
17 Michaels, R. 2010. 44.
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The Dual State158
Governance from Afar
Governance can be considered, from the perspective of regulation, as the various 
institutionalized modes of social coordination to collectively produce and 
implement binding rules or provide collective “goods.”18 Governance is a dynamic 
and evolutionary phenomenon, particularly at the global level,19 involving process 
and structure, and sometimes calling on the creation of new political manifestations 
and languages. 
I do not see conventional discourse on sovereignty as helpful in understanding 
the nature of modern governance, particularly at the global level. A reason for 
this resides in the incapacity of some regulatory paradigms, such as public 
international law, to break free from the referent of the liberal democratic state 
in the conceptualization of sovereignty, authority, power and obligations. In 
replacing a discourse of sovereignty when looking at the manner in which 
regulation determines governance (and vice versa), an examination of frames 
and actions of particular governance styles is rewarding. Take, for instance, the 
determination of governance by examining the actors which advance it. Therefore, 
liberal democratic state governance is governments, resting on personalities 
and alliances, not on compatibilities, while in multinational global networks 
governance assumes life through negotiation and competition (between firms, 
consumers, shareholders, managers, etc.). As a process, governance is a different 
mode of social coordination. How then is “sociability” for the purpose of a 
common good, to act as a powerful motivation for regulatory collaboration even 
where enforcement shadows diminish and alternative self-interest prevails?
Coordination and collaboration includes:
the involvement of non-governmental actors (companies, civil society) in the 
provision of collective goods through non-hierarchical co-ordination. This  
co-ordination range [sic] from consultation and co-operation, delegation and/
or co-regulation/co-production to private self regulation inside and outside 
the control of governments. Non-hierarchical co-ordination can involve 
governmental actors so long as they refrain from using their coercive powers.20
Sociability is a concept which can deflect the analytical focus of governance away 
from distinctions based on hierarchical coordination. As a dominant mode of 
coordination, I will argue, sociability offers a way of adjusting regulatory strategies 
to confront global crisis whether the governance model relies on a coordinated (or 
suffers a fragmented) state. This said, sociability neither replaces nor diminishes 
18 Borzel, T. and Risse, T. 2010. 114.
19 Brandt, U. 2005. Order and Regulation: Global Governance as a Hegemonic 
Discourse of International Politics? Review of International Political Economy, 12/1, 155–76.
20 Borzel, T. and Risse, T. 2010. 115.
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State Hierarchy and Governance 159
the regulatory significance of hierarchical coordination; it just does not depend on 
hierarchies or even their strong and impending shadow.
The problem facing any consideration of regulation absent a long hierarchical 
shadow is sufficient alternative sanctioning capacity to deter and deal with 
opportunistic self-interest and free-riding. As the discussion of collaborative 
motivation (summarized below) illustrates, the transformation of self-interest 
into common good is a crucial precondition to any diminishing reliance on 
hierarchical sanctioning capacity. It might be no more than the recognition of a 
common positioning in a community of shared risk, and the impending anarchy 
that agreement and compliance violation on a large scale would precipitate, which 
helps achieve such a transition without sacrificing the interest fundamentals of 
a capitalist liberal democracy. A central plank in the reasoning of collaborative 
(flat) regulation is the diminished reliance on sanction or threat in a climate where 
minus efficient impending sanction machinery, friendship and trust, and not 
deterrence and fear, become actualized market relationship essentials rather than 
being confined to normative best practice. Even in consolidated states and certainly 
in those where their authority and reach is limited or fragmented, governance is 
multi-level and multi-layered. As Borzel and Risse conclude, the diversity of state 
constellation is not a sign of its withering. Michaels sees the state as mythical 
as non-state governance but both views would accept that “At stake then is the 
transformation of the state rather than its disappearance.”21 In collaborative (flat) 
regulation the consolidated state can facilitate dialogue, but its role even at this 
level is on par with any other alternative functional equivalent.
Shadow of Hierarchy
The shadow of hierarchy provides an important incentive structure for cooperation, 
particularly between non-state actors. Whether the state is weak or strong it 
appears that for differing reasons such as compromised autonomy/capture, and 
a reluctance to share governance authority, states are not keen to coordinate with 
non-state actors unless:
• the regulatory terrain is specialized beyond the knowledge and capacity of 
the state;
• the regulatory terrain has large supranational reach;
• there operate successful and pre-existing non-state regulatory networks;
• pressure groups are urging such collaboration;
• the state is otherwise reluctant to manage the regulatory challenge for 
political or economic reasons; or
• the crisis to be managed is either largely caused by state action/inaction or 
it is beyond state capacity to resolve.
21 Borzel, T. and Risse, T. 2010. 128.
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The Dual State160
Where state-centered foundations for the shadow of enforcement hierarchies are 
weak or absent, alternative frameworks of regulation may emerge explained by 
what March and Olsen (1998) distinguish as the logic of consequences or the 
logic of appropriateness.22 As an essential part of the logic of consequences 
actors and agencies whose self-interested behavior is otherwise essentialist and 
defines their mission, and whose prime purpose is the attainment of private rather 
than public good, become constrained into governance concerns. In contexts of 
global crisis, the need to invest in the common good in situations of economy 
and political dysfunction and instability (Braithwaite’s regulatory “window” in 
boom/bust regulatory cycles23), and where legal and property rights are shaky, the 
inducement into collaborative regulation is strong and immediate. This is so even 
where the shadow of hierarchy is weak and distant either for the period of the 
crisis or prevailing as a consequence of the limited and fragmented existence of 
the state, or other important equivalent regulatory frames.
Incentive Structures
The bulk of my examination of regulating global crisis will be concerned with 
creating conditions and incentivizing relationships which ensure that non-state 
actors and agencies engage in effective and sustainable regulatory governance in 
areas of limited statehood. I argue that the dominant governance terrain in which 
crises are formed and in which they will largely be met in the medium term is 
where the reach and shadow of the state remains indistinct. This does not exclude 
the role of strong states and hegemonies in crisis regulation. On the contrary, the 
under-utilization of effective hierarchical governance, particularly when it comes 
to environmental regulation, is a significant reason for how the world became 
crisis ridden. Rather, the argument goes that while the failure of state-centered 
regulation is a failure of will and not capacity, the disengagement or avoidance 
of a massive reserve of regulatory potential (and crisis generating reasoning) in 
non-state sanctioned hierarchical regulatory modes needs critical reflection and 
policy empowerment.
The logic of consequences suggests that motivations for contributing to 
regulatory governance can be stimulated by repositioning self-interest into the 
common good. One path to such repositioning is the fear which emerges from a 
realization of positioning within communities of shared risk. Through the lens of 
sociability another forceful and under-recognized incentive toward participatory 
regulatory governance (without the strong shadow of hierarchical enforcement) 
emerges when key self-interested actors become embedded in normative structures 
that induce them to do the right thing. While it might be hoped for the sake of good 
22 March, J. and Olsen, J. 1998. The Institutional Dynamics of International Political 
Orders. International Organisation, 52, 943–69.
23 Braithwaite, J. 2008. Chapter 2.
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State Hierarchy and Governance 161
governance and the proliferation of corporate social responsibility that altruism 
brings this conviction about, it could equally or more realistically be that the 
investment in, say, community health, is to ensure a productive workforce and not 
merely to seek the betterment of mankind. Whatever, the regulatory outcome may 
well be the same and the benefit as individually valuable. This regulatory ethos 
will be more effectively ensured through a mix of self-interest and commitment 
to the common good as it would be in situations where the hegemonic enforcer is 
standing by. If commercial interests in particular wish to do business in the vast 
world of limited or fragmented state influence it is not a question of preferring 
enforcement based hierarchical shadows, but adapting to the reality of faint or far 
off external intervention.
For instance, where multinational corporations intersect with large NGOs and 
PPPs in contexts where states are limited and fragmented in their authority and 
reach, traditional norms can be employed (even where they may be conservative 
and reactionary) toward the creation of “socially embedded markets.”24 In 
socially embedded markets we see evidenced a consolidation of both “logics” 
for collaboration, where the consequential and the appropriate meet for mutual 
stakeholder benefit. In this respect, the state is not the sponsor of social 
responsibility; in fact it is often essential that it should not be so for reasons of 
conflict of interest or cultures of corrupt administration.25 Socially embedded 
markets can provide a functional equivalent for the shadow of hierarchy and, as 
will be argued later, the collaborative nature of socially embedded markets flattens 
the need for, or attractiveness of hierarchical regulation once state sanctions are 
bypassed.
The argument here relies on a confidence in regulatory cooperation, however 
attained, not only to address global crisis in a more responsible and responsive 
fashion, but to do so where the shadow of regulatory hierarchy is faintest or most 
distant. While regulatory competition can precede cooperation, unlike with the 
regulatory co-opetition literature,26 discussion of regulatory cooperation to follow 
will not tie itself to concerns for inter-, intra- or extra-governmentality.27 To do so 
necessitates some linear order of regulatory status again with state government at 
the top (or at least positioned recurrently in situations of key influence).
Regulatory reformers in the United States have called for decentralization 
in the name of “federalism.” In Europe, a similar sentiment advances under 
the banner of “subsidiarity.” One of the underlying and critical theoretical 
24 This term infers a process where even the most self-interested firms are turned to 
the common good not through altruism but pragmatism which reveals the commercially 
consolidating potential of corporate social responsibility and community investment.
25 See Findlay, M. 2007. Misunderstanding Corruption and Community: Comparative 
Cultural Politics in Corruption Prevention in the Pacific. Asian Criminology, 2, 47–56.
26 Borzel, T. and Risse, T. 2010. 123–6.
27 Jordana, J. and Levi-Faur, D. 1994. The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and 
Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance. London: Edward Elgar. Chapter 1.
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The Dual State162
premises of these two movements is the suggestion that “regulatory competition” 
among horizontally arrayed governments will generate pressures for improved 
governmental efficiency in the regulatory realm. Critics have suggested that rather 
than welfare-enhancing competitive pressures, divergent regulatory standards may 
instead trigger a welfare-reducing “race toward the bottom.” Esty and Geradin 
argue28 that both race-toward-the-bottom and regulatory competition theories are 
overstated from a descriptive point of view and unsatisfactory from a normative 
perspective. Regulatory theory (they argue) must reflect the diversity and 
complexity of the world. When global crises are located beyond the shadow of the 
state, much more than for crises in consolidated states I assert, optimal governance 
requires a flexible mix of competition and cooperation between government 
actors as well as between governmental and non-governmental actors, along both 
horizontal and vertical dimensions. That said, as the state hierarchical shadow 
diminishes, the regulatory order flattens and cooperation is not only more essential 
but more attractive even if difficult to establish and maintain through trust and 
friendship bonds. Esty and Geradin plump for an enriched model of “regulatory 
co-opetition”29 recognizing that sometimes regulatory competition will prove to 
be advantageous but in other cases a greater form of collaboration will produce 
superior results. In a world that is pluralistic, not simplistic, a combination of 
regulatory competition and cooperation will almost always be optimal. Again 
where my preferred analysis moves on from co-opetition models is by leaving the 
bond of consolidated state hierarchies in favor of social citizenship and socially 
embedded regulatory environments.30
Social Citizenship—Pathway to Flatter Regulation
Social citizenship, whether in the form that this chapter develops sociability, or 
in more conventional discussions of corporate social responsibility (CSR), is a 
perspective on regulation which helps us understand the limited choices available 
in any regulatory mix:
the degree of control that regulators have in the design and enforcement of a 
particular regulatory regime varies. Regulators’ capacity to shape an effective 
regime may be extremely limited if concerns about political legitimacy dominate 
decisions about what legislative or regulatory tools are made available …  
28 Esty, D. and Geradin, D. 2000. Regulatory Co-opetition. Journal of International 
Economic Law, 3/2, 235–55.
29 Defined by Esty and Geradin as an optimal business strategy requiring a mix of 
competitive and cooperative actions. Also see, Brandenberg, A. and Nalebuff, B. 1996. 
Co-optition. New York: Currency Doubleday.
30 Taylor-Gooby, P. 2008. Reframing Social Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
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State Hierarchy and Governance 163
A focus on human agency is timely and intrinsic to the concept of a regulator as 
a “sociological citizen” reflecting and acting creatively to bring about beneficial 
outcomes. According to proponents, sociological citizens are creative and self-
directed, they draw on a broad canvass to achieve regulatory goals.31
According to Silbey et al. “sociological citizens” view “their work and themselves, 
as links in a complex web of interactions and processes rather than as an office 
of delimited responsibilities and interests.”32 Sociability, which is the mark of the 
social (or “sociological”) citizen regulator does not emerge or is not sustained in 
some purely normative abstract. It is deeply contextual. The more we move that 
context away from the shadow of the consolidated state, the more sociability is 
actualized through lateral relationships which neither depend on but indeed avoid 
the need for a state-topped regulatory hierarchy.
Sociability is a process where potential mutual regulators gain a level of 
perspective which is influenced deeply by their experience of crisis and their 
role within it which enables them to exercise a more profound understanding of 
regulatory responsibility and its implications. This deeper understanding allows 
the mutual regulator to see both crisis and ordering as they, are rather than as 
they should be, prompting them to engage in regulation in a more responsive and 
responsible fashion. As C. Wright Mills may have it, such understandings translate 
into a sociological imagination that prompts the mutual regulator to improve rather 
than subvert the larger system of common good through norm experimentation.33 
They do not wait on state compulsion or on state agency for better regulatory 
outcomes.
Michaels, in his denial of the essentialist state hierarchy when imagining 
new governance forms, suggests a novel trajectory of thinking.34 Much of 
the recent discussion concerning governance where the state is essentially at a 
hierarchical peak has been influenced by Michel Foucault. But as Selby points 
out35 the limitations of Foucault as a theorist of world politics is explained by his 
lack of interest in supranational and international realms. Even so, the state or 
supranational context in which, as Foucault would argue, knowledge is power, 
explains the currency of hierarchy: the capacity to ensure social differentiation 
through who regulates knowledge.
Michaels further projects:
31 Haines, F. 2011. Addressing the Risk, Reading the Landscape: The Role of Agency 
in Regulation. Regulation and Governance, 5, 118–44.
32 Silbey, S., Huising, R. and Coslovsky, S. 2009. The Sociological Citizen: Relational 
Interdependence in Law and Organisations. L’Annee Sociologique, 59/1, 201–29.
33 Mills, C. W. 1967. The Sociological Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
34 Michaels, R. 2010. 44–5.
35 Selby, J. 2007. Discourse, Liberal Governance and the Limits of Foucauldian IR. 
International Relations, 21, 324.
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A more important step concerns the very hierarchy of levels. If it is correct that 
we are observing a move in the world from a political segmentary differentiation 
along state borders to a functional differentiation along different societal groups 
then this suggests that the methodologically central position of the state is 
wavering too. Note in a world that shifts from territoriality to functionality, the 
state does not automatically lose its role on functional grounds. A trajectory of 
theoretical accounts of governance should enable us to overcome this focus on 
the state … a more specific analysis of modes and structures of hybridity, or 
of the particular mix of public and private governance. This makes it possible, 
at least, to deny the state its central position in the analysis and to develop, on 
a fourth level, a governance theory beyond the state. On that level, the state’s 
institutions exist on an equal level, analytically, with non-state institutions …  
A governance concept that transcends the distinction between state and non-
state laws, by contrast, should enable us truly to imagine governance not only 
outside the state, but outside even the dichotomy of state/non-state, outside the 
state framework altogether.36
Such an analytical progression when directed to the regulation component of 
governance offers the possibility of laterally (rather than hierarchically) viewing 
collaborative regulation in limited or fragmented state contexts. Having moved 
so far away from the shadow of state hierarchy in regulation, it is appropriate 
to return to the reality of modern regulatory trends, whether they are seen in the 
context of consolidated states and global capitalism, or as I would prefer, in a 
world where regulation relies on alternative functional equivalents which explain 
the potential of regulatory collaboration in the face of global crisis.
The Ubiquity of Regulation
Along with socioeconomic development comes the regulation of most aspects 
of daily life. This age of regulation is both driven by and transcends modern 
market economics, in the same way it transcends a mono-cultural, mono-political 
or mono-economic conception of the state. Whether it is through the advance of 
supranational mega-corporatism, economic globalization, or conversely market 
failure, regulation imbues developed Western legal traditions, cultures, governance 
and much that gives contemporary society its form and vitality. Why is this so? Why 
is it also the case that an orientalist, or myopic regulatory discourse which exists 
in the shadow of consolidated states has for too long ignored the consequences for 
and appropriateness of other regulatory agendas where the state shadow is faint 
or distant? Perhaps the answer lies in a century and a half of triumphant market 
36 Michaels, R. 2010. 44–5.
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capitalism and an age of globalization where materialist economic development 
and modernization is the dominant global frame.37
Even the market failure welfarist critics see the common sense of extensive 
state regulation:
Markets fail, a Pigouvian (1938)38 would say, because of externalities, 
asymmetric information, and lack of competition, and governments need to 
regulate them to counter these failures. Regulation is ubiquitous because market 
failures are.39
The case for regulatory capitalism explains epidemic regulation particularly at 
the global level as the essential economic and political context in which mega-
corporatism thrives. In this we can identify the symbiotic relationship between 
regulation, new capitalism and the growth of state regulatory capacity.
[R]egulation, particularly anti-trust and securitisation of national debt, enabled 
the growth of both provider and regulatory states. Regulation did this through 
pushing the spread of large corporations … the corporatization of the world 
increased the efficacy of tax enforcement, funding the provider and regulatory 
state growth. The corporatization of the world drove globalization … this was a 
very different capitalism and a very different world of governance than existed 
in the early twentieth century capitalism of family firms.40
This would seem to run contrary to the law and economics tradition which 
suggests that the relentless drive of competition and the strategic intervention of 
contract arrangements and tort actions address market failure, leaving little space 
for regulation.41 If this is so, and if it is looked at against the empirical evidence of 
the recent exponential regulatory growth explosion,42 is it fair to suggest that the 
ubiquity and efficiency of regulation may not go hand in hand?
37 Findlay, M. 1999. 
38 Pigouvian market analysis saw market failure not as a failure of markets but of 
market conditions. For a development of these views see Carlton, D. and Loury, G. 1980. 
The Limitation of Pigouvian Taxes as a Long Run Remedy for Externalities. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 95/3, 559–66.
39 Shleifer, A. 2010. Efficient Regulation. NBER Working Paper No. 15651. Issued 
in January 2010.
40 Braithwaite, J. 2008. 28–9.
41 Coase, R. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 
3, 1–44.
42 Levi-Faur, D. and Jordana, J. eds. 2011. The Rise of Regulatory Capitalism: The 
Global Diffusion of a New Order. London: Sage.
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Smart regulation,43 meta-regulation,44 responsive regulation,45 really responsive 
regulation,46 problem solving regulation47 and regulatory competition48 are recent 
approaches to the regulatory agenda which indicate a compatible explosion in 
scholarship and critique of contemporary regulatory thinking. Despite this regulatory 
renaissance the person in the street could be left wondering at the incredulity from 
those responsible for managing global crisis, when crises take hold.49
This chapter asks why we live in a world of such intrusive and expanding 
public and private regulation, outside the limits of the law. This critical approach 
is adopted in explaining regulatory ubiquity for several reasons. Not least of which 
it is recognized that as social, commercial and political relations move beyond 
the nation-state, the jurisdictional character and confines of domestic law and 
its essential place in command/control regulation and enforcement need to be 
re-envisioned. It is argued that with regulation operating de-centered from the 
state,50 and more and more in networks of private interest, the inextricability of 
law (expressive or facilitative) and regulation cannot be taken for granted. For the 
regulation of global crisis in particular, law and lawyers, local and international, 
have a job arguing their relevance in meaningful regulatory responses beyond an 
expressive or supportive role. The critical analysis of crisis regulation will put the 
place of law into a sharp regulatory perspective. The test of whether crisis can be 
transformed to orderliness is asserted as a more convincing measure of regulatory 
efficiency than market success or failure.51
43 Gunnigham, N. and Grabosky, P. 1998. Smart Regulation: Designing 
Environmental Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
44 Parker, C. 2002. The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
45 Ayers, I. and Braithwaite, J. 1992. Responsive Regulation. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
46 Baldwin, R and Black, J. 2008. Really Responsive Regulation. Modern Law 
Review, 71/1, 59–94.
47 Sparrow, M. 2000. The Regulatory Craft. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
48 Jordana, J. and Levi-Faure, D. 1994.
49 An example of this is the common response of economic analysts that they did not 
foresee the financial meltdown of 2008 continuing beyond the limited context of American 
mortgage failure. 
50 Black, J. 2001. Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and 
Self-Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World. Current Legal Problems, 54/1, 103–46.
51 In proposing this alternative we would be foolish to ignore the economic (and 
more particularly, market) objectives for regulation. The assertion is intended, however, 
to allow for situations where a regulatory fixation on market failure may itself lead on to 
related and non-related global crisis regulatory challenges.
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Sociability—New Non-State Relations
This analysis considers regulatory sociability as both the characteristic and 
consequence of relevant regulation, countering the criticism of modern 
regulatory intervention as reflecting little more than politicized popular responses 
to economic crisis. In the richest, most representative and benign governance 
structures regulation abounds, charged as it is with obtaining and retaining the 
quality of life for citizens and civil society. That said, we need to interrogate 
beyond self-interest in the direction of forces that achieve mutuality revealing 
what makes regulation efficient in achieving any such political and social 
aspiration.
Legal tools such as contracts and damages claims are themselves heavily 
regulated. Well-functioning courts manage and enforce legal remedies and resolve 
disputes, but when litigation is expensive, unpredictable or biased, regulatory 
capacity and efficiency is at risk. In addition, market failure and information 
asymmetries are not always essential triggers for regulation. Regulatory 
intervention often precedes market failure, and goes well beyond market need. In 
these respects I consider whether regulation is driven more by political imperatives 
than by efficiency or outcome-based motivations. Recognizing the reality that 
regulatory regimes are vulnerable to capture by the commercial, political and 
social interests which they are set to regulate,52 the chapter has revealed those 
foundational social bonds which are strained in crisis and restored in orderliness. 
This is the framework of regulatory sociability.
The outcome of regulatory sociability should reflect culturally sensitive and 
contextually efficient institutional and process adaptations of governance to a 
complex and globalized world. The measure of this at the sharp edge is the way in 
which conciliatory and collaborative (not just responsive or reflexive) regulation 
moves chaos and crisis to orderliness. An essential precondition for sociability, 
and for the effectiveness of collaborative regulation, is trust.
Cooperative compliance as a cause and consequence of regulatory sociability 
entails the creation of regulatory relationships based on trust. Only where 
externalized incentives to cooperate trump the need for trust, and these could 
include legal compulsion, will such trust relationships recede and sociability 
diminish in any organic form. But in conclusion, mechanical and imposed 
regulatory regimes of re-ordering crisis are unsustainable due to a variety of critical 
reasons. For crisis, particularly global, to be convincingly converted to orderliness 
that lasts, regulation wherein players can be taken at their word, and dialogue 
between them is honest; where interests are mutualized and agreed rules are fair 
and applicable; and there is a resultant preference for cooperative regularity, are 
required if sociability is to emerge.
52 Stigler, G. 1971. The Theory of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science, 2/1, 145–85.
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However, the aspirations for regulatory sociability expressed in this chapter 
are neither naïve or altruistic. Much is said about the externalization of risk to 
communities who do not share in the private (and legally endorsed) interests 
and protections of regulated commercial environments. The need to break into 
that legalized, privatized domain in order to advance through pluralist regulation 
strong and shared notions of public (general) good is well recognized.53 The 
inducement to collaborate, not from the acceptance of mutual as opposed to self-
interest, at least in the short-term, is explored in communities of shared risk. 
The fragility of cooperative compliance if it depends on best practice or good 
corporate citizenship is critically anticipated. From within the conditions of 
regulatory sociability, a hard look is cast at the possibility of realigning global 
preferencing from economic wealth and material profit to sustainability in all its 
life forms. Finally, risk aversion and crisis reduction are not causally assumed, and 
orderliness not naturally expected as a consequence of sociability without a very 
critical appreciation of the vulnerable conditions which create and continue any 
collaborative regulatory frame.
Regulation’s Reality
Regulation can take many forms. Within broad regulatory frames there can exist 
and operate a variety of styles ranging from:
• conversations and dialogue
• behavioral incentives
• inducements
• persuasion
• precautions
• inspections
• rules, agreed or imposed
• licenses to act or associate
• boundaries within which enterprise can be achieved
• best practice
• compliance
• sanction to command and control.
What often determines the choice and mix of these styles, or the manner in which 
they may be graduated or escalated, is whether the purpose of the regulator is 
for intentional change, or rather expressive governance. These intentions need 
not be exclusive and the selection of regulatory strategy to follow, not integrated, 
53 For a discussion of this in the context of promoting general interests into 
construction contracts where agreements for advancing the built environment, risk the 
quality of life for non-contracting communities see, Perez, O. 2002. 77–110.
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balanced or inclusive. Regulation all too often is a struggle between, rather than a 
reconciliation of, competing interests. That is where the chapter’s commitment to 
sociability comes in: to influence purpose; to assist in the selection of strategy; to 
construct modes of operation; and to calibrate outcomes and measures of efficiency. 
Regarding the latter, efficiency as I see it is impacted upon by institutional choices 
and not dependent on the maintenance of public–private distinction.54
Regulation is neither just a “thing” nor a “result.” In appreciating truly dynamic 
regulatory frames in transitional state contexts I advocate examining institutions 
and technologies of regulation. This is preceded by the critical consideration of 
regulation as theory. Then we need to look particularly at regulatory authorship, 
and regulatory space, followed by contextual considerations of regulation as change 
agents. Next the legitimacy of regulation for various locations of governance is 
particularly reflected against accountability and as such it is inevitable to consider 
the preferred regulatory regime and regulation outcome of sociability. All this is 
for the larger purpose of appreciating the big picture transition of global crisis to 
orderliness in specific places and stages of political economy.
In an age of globalization, moving out of a terror-risk focus into considerations 
of risk and securitization with a broader world focus, the need for collaborative 
internationalist engagement is no longer an aspiration. Transnational and 
international regulatory conversations and strategies have taken the context of 
regulation beyond the interests and boundaries of the nation-state. No longer 
is collaborative regulation limited to compliance in narrow corporate settings. 
The operation of risk and securitization within global governance is producing 
collaboration as a result of bio-political normalization and not simply through 
normative accession.55
As Cooley observes, too much recent analytical focus on globalization, 
particularly from the perspective of political economy, is constrained in a way:
that globalization should be viewed as s hierarchical set of structures, institutions 
and processes. Of course there are various strands of the “globalization as 
hierarchy” approach … Even those who make the case that this new global 
system is not comparable to previous political economic orders find it difficult to 
discard altogether the hierarchy and imperialism analogies … even if we reject 
state-centred accounts of international political economy in favour of a more 
globalist or hierarchical understandings of economic governance, rationalist 
54 While maintaining such distinction throughout their analysis Morgan and Yeung 
accept and advance a hybridization of theory and practice such as Braithwaite’s Tripartism 
which undermines in action the public and private regulatory domains. Morgan, B. and 
Yeung, K. 2007.
55 Findlay, M. 2008. Governing through Globalised Crime: Futures for International 
Criminal Justice. Columpton: Willan.
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formulations still offer invaluable insights into the political dynamics of the 
contemporary international system.56
Rationalist engagement with the manner in which the state is or is not essential in 
confronting global crisis precipitates a richer discussion of alternative functional 
equivalents to the shadow of state hierarchy as a regulatory enforcer. As with 
law, and its problematic relationship with consolidated states, and from there 
its questionable relevance in regulating global crisis, the measure of a capacity 
to move crisis to ordering without the shadow of the state depends not on an 
institutional analysis of state-dependent governance forms but rather a functional 
understanding of what motivates embracing the common good. Regulation 
is an essential purpose and a critical challenge for the state, law, supranational 
governance and alternative functional equivalents to the shadow of the hierarchical 
consolidated state in the modern age.
56 Cooley, A. 2003. 672–4.
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